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REVERSE PAYMENT AGREEMENTS: WHY A “QUICK LOOK” 
PROPERLY PROTECTS PATENTS AND PATIENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulating the pharmaceutical industry has proven to be precarious 
because of the unique landscape of the market. On the one hand, 
pharmaceutical companies are encouraged and rewarded for developing 
innovative, and oftentimes, lifesaving drugs.1 Yet, on the other hand, 
regulation is required to ensure that there is competition in the market to drive 
down prices and make prescription drugs affordable.2 The sometimes-
conflicting goals of encouraging innovation and ensuring competition to drive 
down prices have created difficulties for Congress, courts, and regulatory 
agencies in framing rules and regulations for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Antitrust analysis concerning the pharmaceutical industry’s use of reverse 
payment agreements has become increasingly divided and complex. Congress, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and 
numerous circuit courts have approached this issue and applied varied tests in 
analyzing the occurrence of reverse payments. When the Third Circuit threw 
its hat in with its decision in In re K-Dur, it provided yet another determination 
on the antitrust implications of reverse payments.3 The holding in In re K-Dur 
created a significant divide among the circuit courts in considering what 
 
 1. Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission Before the Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate on 
Barriers to Generic Entry, in 6 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. APPENDIX E142 (2013). 
 2. See id. (citing the necessity of addressing escalating drug expenditures as a reason 
behind Congress’s passage of the Hatch–Waxman Amendments). 
 3. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). In In re K-Dur, Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Merck), Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (Upsher), and Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 
were named as parties to the litigation. Following the decision by the Third Circuit, Merck, as 
well as Upsher, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which 
the Supreme Court granted. After issuing its opinion in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013), the Supreme Court vacated the In re K-Dur decision and remanded the cases back to the 
Third Circuit, in light of its Actavis decision. The fact that the In re K-Dur decision was vacated 
does not affect my analysis of the decision, nor my conclusions in this Comment. In this 
Comment, the In re K-Dur decision is reviewed in the context of its importance in creating a 
circuit split in analyzing reverse payment agreements, which is not affected by the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
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analysis is appropriate for reverse payments.4 As such, in order to align the 
competing tests and provide the pharmaceutical industry with a more stable 
analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court was urged to consider the legality of reverse 
payments because of the issue’s “exceptional importance to the national 
economy” and the well-defined circuit split.5 The Supreme Court finally 
granted certiorari on this issue and ultimately considered whether reverse 
payment agreements are per se lawful or whether these agreements are 
presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful.6 
In Part I of this Comment, I provide a brief introduction to the 
pharmaceutical industry, paying particular attention to the development of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act and its regulatory impact on the industry. Additionally, I 
provide an introduction to reverse payment agreements and their impact on the 
pharmaceutical industry. In Part II, I examine the development of the circuit 
split and explain how different circuits have analyzed reverse payment 
agreements. Then, in Part III, I briefly describe Congress’s failed attempts at 
resolving this issue legislatively and discuss why further attempts are likely to 
fail as well. In Part IV, I explain why the circuit split and the failure of 
Congress to successfully legislate this issue ripened it for Supreme Court 
review, and I outline the Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis. In Part V, I 
discuss previous Supreme Court decisions relating to similar disputes and 
explain how they might have informed the Court’s ruling. Finally, in Parts VI 
and VII, I present and justify what I believe is the most desirable test for 
“reverse payment” agreements, arguing that the Supreme Court should have 
adopted a “quick look” approach. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Landscape of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
In the past decade, much attention has been given to the development of 
innovative, and oftentimes exorbitantly expensive, prescription drugs. While 
pharmaceutical innovations have benefited Americans and facilitated the 
treatment of some medical conditions in a more effective manner, the cost of 
pharmaceuticals has garnered some criticism. Prescription drug spending in 
 
 4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari submitted by Merck & Co., Inc. at 17, Merck & Co., Inc. 
v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 686 F.3d 197 (3d. Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013), and sub nom. Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (No. 12-245) [hereinafter Merck Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari submitted by The Fed. Trade Comm’n at 10, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) [hereinafter FTC Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 6. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
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2010 totaled approximately $260 billion—about ten percent of the nation’s 
total healthcare spending.7 Significantly, the rate of increase for commonly 
used prescription drugs is higher than the rate of increase in the medical 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), averaging 6.6 percent compared to 3.8 percent 
from 2006–2010, respectively.8 Additionally, although prescription drug costs 
make up only ten percent of health care spending, it receives considerable 
attention because expenditures have grown 114 percent from 2000 until 2010, 
with no end in sight.9 The increase in prescription drug spending is attributable 
primarily to brand name drugs, as brand name drug spending increased at an 
average annual rate of 8.3 percent from 2006–2010, compared to generic drug 
spending, which decreased 2.6 percent over the same time period.10 
Prescription drug prices and the mechanisms that sustain them have garnered 
scrutiny in recent years because of the considerable amount of healthcare 
spending apportioned to the industry. 
The stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry are heavily dependent on 
patent protection. As an industry, billions are spent each year on research and 
development for new drugs, most of which will not develop into viable 
products.11 The industry relies on patent protection for the drugs that ultimately 
are deemed effective in order to secure profits, recoup their initial investment, 
and funnel some of those profits toward research and development of new 
drugs.12 In fact, as patent protections expire for such blockbuster drugs as 
Pfizer’s Lipitor, it is suggested that consumers will initially benefit as lower 
cost generics enter the market, but that they should also be wary because they 
may suffer over the long-term if these brand name manufacturers cut back on 
research and development because of a loss in profits.13 Brand name drug 
manufacturers argue that patent protection is essential for the viability of the 
 
 7. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER: KEY INFORMATION 
ON HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT 10 (May 2012), http://www.kff.org/insurance/up 
load/7670_02.pdf. 
 8. U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-306R, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: TRENDS 
IN USUAL AND CUSTOMARY PRICES FOR COMMONLY USED DRUGS 3 (2011). Significantly, the 
dramatic inflation of prescription drug prices is most concerning when compared to the consumer 
price index for all items. In 2012, the Consumer Price Index for all items less food and energy 
rose 1.9 percent, compared to the Consumer Price Index for medical care, which rose 3.2 percent. 
News Release, Consumer Price Index—December 2012, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB. 3 (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_01162013.pdf. 
 9. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 7, at 1. 
 10. U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 11. Yuki Onoe, “Pay-For-Delay” Settlements in Pharmaceutical Litigation: Drawing a 
Fine Line Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 528, 
531 (2009). 
 12. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63 (2006). 
 13. Duff Wilson, Patent Woes Threatening Drug Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1. 
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pharmaceutical industry because, once a drug’s formula is understood, it is 
fairly easy and cheap for others to manufacture it without incurring the 
expensive initial research and development costs.14 Proponents of 
pharmaceutical patent protection argue that is it necessary in order to 
incentivize pharmaceutical companies to spend millions on research for the 
development of new and innovative drugs.15 
Although patents are necessary to protect pharmaceutical innovations, 
these patents should not unduly prohibit competition or be free from antitrust 
scrutiny. Many characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry make it ripe for 
collusion and other anti-competitive tactics that require antitrust regulation.16 
First, pharmaceuticals developed by the industry often have a low elasticity of 
demand, meaning that increases in price will not greatly affect consumer 
demand for the product.17 Because pharmaceuticals often mean the difference 
between pain and relief or life and death for consumers, they are unlikely to 
stop purchasing drugs based on an artificially high price.18 Studies have 
indicated that the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals may range 
from -0.05 to -0.08.19 As a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers are able to 
charge prices that are above competitive levels.20 Second, consumers are 
typically unaware of the actual cost of their drugs.21 Most consumers have 
insurance companies that act as third-party payors and shield them from the 
full impact of their drug cost.22 Thus, consumers may continue purchasing 
 
 14. Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1563–65. 
 15. Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch–Waxman Act and the Conflict Between Antitrust Law & 
Patent Law, 48 IDEA 381, 383 (2008) (explaining that “[p]atents grant potential monopolies to 
innovators in an effort to encourage innovation by allowing them to charge higher prices to 
recoup money spent on research and development.”). 
 16. Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 
U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 11 (2004). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Joshua P. Davis & Steig Olson, Efforts to Delay Competition From Generic Drugs: 
Litigation Along a Seismic Fault Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 39 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2004); Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 11. 
 19. JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., NAT’L DEF. RES. INST., THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR 
HEALTH CARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY 
HEALTH SYSTEM 35 (2002). If a product is perfectly price inelastic, its price elasticity will be 
zero. In contrast, a product that is perfectly price elastic will be one. Thus, the closer a product’s 
price elasticity is to zero, the less elasticity in price the product has. Compare the price elasticity 
of pharmaceuticals to the price elasticity of soda, which is approximately 0.80. This indicates that 
consumers are much more likely to change their spending habits if the price of soda increased 
than if the price of a pharmaceutical increased. Tatiana Andreyeva et al., The Impact of Food 
Prices on Consumption: A Systematic Review of Research on the Price Elasticity of Demand for 
Food, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 216, 217–18 (2010). 
 20. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 11. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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drugs even when they are priced above their competitive level. Finally, 
although there are many different drugs available for a wide array of ailments, 
usually there are a very limited number of drugs available to treat a specific 
ailment.23 Typically, a physician may only deem two or three drugs as viable 
options for a specific patient.24 Thus, collusion within these small groupings of 
drugs is not only possible but also highly likely, as cartels with small numbers 
are always more threatening than cartels with large numbers.25 Courts and 
antitrust regulators need to take these industry factors into consideration when 
analyzing agreements among and between pharmaceutical companies. 
Although innovation needs to be rewarded, collusion among manufacturers 
and other anticompetitive behavior should be prevented so as to maintain 
competitive pricing levels. 
In analyzing the activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers, it is 
imperative to take into consideration the landscape of the industry. Regulations 
aimed at increasing competition and reducing anticompetitive behavior need to 
be tailored in such a manner so that they do not affect the patent rights of 
pharmaceutical innovators in an unfair or unduly way. 
B. Hatch–Waxman Act and Reverse Payments 
Pharmaceutical companies spend enormous sums in order to bring a new, 
viable product to market. As such, they fund a broad range of patents, casting 
their net wide to protect potentially viable products from competitors.26 These 
pharmaceutical companies then have a possibility of a twenty-year exclusive 
patent on their brand name drug.27 During this exclusivity period, the brand 
name pharmaceutical company can reap great, monopoly-level profits on the 
sale of the patented drug.28 The patent protection for the pharmaceutical 
companies is intended to reward them for their time spent on research and 
development.29 Yet, although these pharmaceutical manufacturers have a 
patent on certain brand name drugs, it does not protect the patent for life, nor 
does it protect the patent from being challenged by generic drug 
manufacturers. 
The Hatch–Waxman Act encourages generic drug manufacturers to 
challenge the patents held by brand name drug manufacturers by certifying that 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 11. 
 26. Onoe, supra note 11, at 531. 
 27. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, PATENT 
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH–
WAXMAN ACT”) 2 (2005). 
 28. Clements, supra note 15, at 383. 
 29. Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1562–65. 
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either the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or 
sale of a new drug that the generic is planning on manufacturing.30 These 
generic drug manufacturers must file an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to begin 
manufacturing and marketing of the new, generic version of the drug.31 An 
ANDA allows the generic drug manufacturer to rely on the costly safety and 
efficacy studies done by the brand name manufacturer to assert that the active 
ingredients of the drug are safe and effective.32 Furthermore, the generic 
manufacturer who submits the first ANDA receives an exclusive 180-day 
period to manufacture and sell the generic drug before the FDA will approve 
any subsequent ANDA applications.33 The exclusive 180-day period is 
triggered when either the first ANDA applicant begins commercially 
marketing its generic drug or when there is a court decision ruling that the 
patent is either invalid or not infringed.34 The 180-day exclusivity period is 
considered a “bounty worth hundreds of millions of dollars” and provides 
generic drug companies an estimated sixty percent to eighty percent of their 
potential profits for a product.35 Once an ANDA is filed, the patent-holder of 
the drug has forty-five days to respond and file a patent infringement action 
against the generic drug manufacturer applicant.36 If the patent-holder files 
suit, a thirty-month stay goes into effect.37 During this time, the FDA cannot 
approve the generic drug unless, during this time, a court hearing the patent 
infringement case finds that the patent is either invalid or not infringed.38 
After an ANDA is filed and challenged by a brand name drug 
manufacturer, the manufacturer of the patented drug may, as an alternative to 
patent litigation, pay an agreed-upon sum to the generic challenger.39 Such 
agreements are deemed reverse payments or “pay-for-delay” settlements. 
These agreements typically stipulate that the brand name manufacturer will 
pay the generic manufacturer a large sum of money and, in return, the generic 
manufacturer will forgo entry into the generic market for the drug at issue.40 
The effect of these agreements is to remove early competition in the market for 
 
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). 
 31. Id. § 355(j). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Michael R. Herman, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for 
Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1797 
(2011). 
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
 37. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1568. 
 40. Id. at 1568–70. 
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the brand name drug and deny consumers the benefit of receiving a lower 
price.41 In a recent report issued by the FTC, the agency found that reverse 
payment agreements are prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry, citing the 
occurrence of sixty-six such agreements from 2004–2009.42 Additionally, the 
report indicated that such agreements delay entry of a generic competitor to the 
market for an average of seventeen months.43 The FTC has acknowledged it 
will aggressively litigate against and condemn reverse payment agreements, 
estimating that these agreements will cost consumers an estimated thirty-five 
billion dollars over the next ten years.44 
The anti-competitive effects of reverse payments were given much 
attention by Congress, regulatory agencies, and circuit courts. However, these 
entities struggled to agree on an appropriate test to apply to such behavior.45 
The continuing litigation of reverse payments in the last decade, coupled with 
the increasing division of the circuit courts in deciding these cases, prompted 
the Supreme Court to recently review a reverse payment agreement.46 
II.  CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
In analyzing whether a reverse payment agreement is valid and legal, 
circuit courts tended to favor either antitrust and its regard for competition, or 
patent law and its regard for innovation. Antitrust law and patent law often 
have conflicting aims. The ultimate goal of the Sherman Act is to stimulate 
competition and innovation by prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination . . . 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” and “monopoliz[ation], or attempt[s] to 
monopolize, or combin[ations] or conspir[acies] . . . to monopolize.”47 
Antitrust’s aims are to discourage collusion and increase competition. The 
ultimate aim of antitrust law is to protect competition, not competitors.48 In 
contrast, the ultimate goal of patent law is to stimulate innovation.49 In order to 
achieve its aims, patent law grants an innovator “the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”50 Throughout 
the last decade, the circuit courts were divided on what test to apply to 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 4 (2010). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. See infra Parts II–III. 
 46. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1–2 (2012). 
 48. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
 49. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2006), 
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 50. Id. 
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instances of reverse payments. As such, the circuit courts generally applied 
either principles of antitrust (per se, rule of reason, or quick look analysis) or a 
“scope of the patent” test, initially articulated by the Eleventh Circuit.51 In a 
more recent circuit court decision analyzing reverse payments, the Third 
Circuit explicitly rejected the “scope of the patent” test in favor of a “quick 
look rule of reason,” which created a clear division among the circuit courts, 
and made the issue ripe for Supreme Court review.52 
A. The Scope of the Patent Test 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., decided by the Eleventh 
Circuit in 2003, considered a patent holder’s antitrust liability for making a 
reverse payment.53 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit limited a patent holder’s 
antitrust liability by the terms of the patent.54 The court determined that “[t]he 
precise terms of the grant[ed statutory rights] define the limits of a patentee’s 
monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed from competition of 
price, service, quality or otherwise.”55 As such, the Eleventh Circuit 
conceptualized, and applied, what is now known as the “scope of the patent 
test.” The scope of the patent test gives much deference to the brand name 
pharmaceutical manufacturer and its patent validity. Specifically, the scope of 
the patent test holds that “[w]hatever damage is done to competition by 
settlement is done pursuant to the monopoly extended to the patent holder . . . 
unless the terms of the settlement enlarge the scope of that monopoly.”56 Thus, 
so long as the agreement between the brand name manufacturer and the 
generic manufacturer lies within the “scope of the patent” held by the brand 
name manufacturer, any anticompetitive conduct is protected pursuant to its 
lawful monopoly.57 Importantly, courts applying the scope of the patent test do 
not concern themselves with evaluating the validity of the patent; rather, they 
merely discern whether the generic manufacturer is attempting to bring a 
product to market that is within the scope of the brand name manufacturer’s 
current patent.58 Using this reasoning, it is assumed that the generic product is 
within the scope of the brand name manufacturer’s patent and that any 
 
 51. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 52. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
 53. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1294–97, 1309. 
 54. Id. at 1312. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006), 
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 57. See id. at 213. 
 58. Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent 
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). 
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anticompetitive conduct arising pursuant to a reverse payment is valid and 
within the legal rights of the patent holder.59 Thus, courts that invoke the scope 
of the patent test do not attempt to analyze any of the antitrust implications of 
reverse payments. Rather, these courts support the notion that “a patent is an 
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a 
free and open market.”60 
In In re Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit considered an agreement between 
the brand name manufacturer of Tamoxifen and a generic competitor, Barr.61 
The agreement was spurred by Barr’s filing of an ANDA with the FDA 
requesting its approval for Barr to market a generic version of Tamoxifen.62 
The brand name manufacturer agreed to pay Barr $21 million and, in 
exchange, Barr agreed that it would not market a generic version of the drug 
until the patent expired.63 Although the court acknowledged that the agreement 
“almost certainly” resulted in less price competition, which would result in 
higher consumer prices for the drug, it refused to find the agreement invalid.64 
The court determined that the agreement was within the bounds of the patent 
that the brand name manufacturer had validly obtained.65 Specifically, the 
court noted that the agreement did not extend the patent monopoly by 
restraining the introduction or marketing of unrelated, non-fringing products.66 
Thus, so long as the agreement restricted the generic manufacturer from 
marketing only Tamoxifen, the agreement was within the scope of the patent. 
Additionally, the court remarked that other generic manufacturers could 
challenge the patent.67 Yet, the court failed to acknowledge that any other 
generic manufacturer who challenged the patent would be restricted from 
beginning its marketing or sale of the product until Barr began marketing its 
version of the product for 180 days. Thus, although a generic manufacturer 
may have filed to challenge the patent, this would be unlikely considering they 
could not begin selling the product. 
The Second Circuit defended its utilization of the deferential scope of the 
patent test based on its analysis of the Hatch–Waxman Act and its 
“incentivizing” of reverse payment agreements.68 The court explained that the 
structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act redistributes the relative risk of engaging 
in patent infringement litigation as it gave generic drug manufacturer 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). 
 61. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 190. 
 62. Id. at 193. 
 63. Id. at 193–94. 
 64. Id. at 216. 
 65. Id. at 213. 
 66. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F. 3d at 213. 
 67. Id. at 214. 
 68. Id. at 206. 
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challengers “considerable leverage” in patent suits.69 Thus, the court appears to 
have adopted the scope of the patent test to redress some wrong it identified in 
the Hatch–Waxman Act. The court stated that there is “no sound basis” for 
“condemning” reverse payments when the purpose is merely to reduce 
uncertainty surrounding the patent’s validity and scope by way of the Hatch–
Waxman Act.70 
Following the lead of the Eleventh and Second Circuits, the Federal Circuit 
also expressly adopted the scope of the patent test. In In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit explained that, when all 
anticompetitive effects of a settlement agreement are within the lawful 
exclusionary power of the patent, it is protected from challenge.71 Additionally, 
the court agreed with the Eleventh and Second Circuits, that, in the absence of 
fraud or sham, “the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the 
antitrust analysis.”72 In holding that the reverse payment at issue was lawful 
and not subject to scrutiny, the court held that there is no basis for “restricting 
the right of a patentee to choose its preferred means of enforcement.”73 
Ultimately, the courts that adopted the scope of the patent test favored the 
protections granted to patent-holders by the patent law even in the face of 
decreased competition and higher consumer prices.74 The scope of the patent 
test gives patent holders broad discretion to engage in anticompetitive 
agreements so long as the agreements do not exceed the scope of the patent. As 
such, application of the scope of the patent test is outcome-determinative, with 
antitrust defendants typically, and uniformly, prevailing as a matter of law in 
these circuits.75 
B. Application of Antitrust Analysis 
In contrast to the “scope of the patent test” applied by the Eleventh, 
Second, and Federal Circuits, some circuits have determined that “reverse 
payment” agreements must be subject to heightened antitrust scrutiny. 
Antitrust scrutiny lies on a continuum, with per se analysis being the strictest, 
and rule of reason the most lenient. The per se rule is reserved for conduct that 
is clearly anticompetitive.76 In order to establish a per se case, a plaintiff must 
show that the conduct engaged in is of the type that is almost always 
 
 69. Id. at 206–07. 
 70. Id. at 207. 
 71. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1337. 
 74. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 216. 
 75. FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
 76. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 19. 
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anticompetitive.77 Courts have deemed per se treatment appropriate “[o]nce 
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with 
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”78 Thus, courts have 
reserved per se analysis for such blatant anticompetitive behavior as horizontal 
price fixing, horizontal market allocation, concerted refusals to deal, and most 
tying arrangements.79 A showing of per se anticompetitive activities thus 
applies a “conclusive presumption” of illegality to certain types of 
agreements.80 In these instances, the court need not consider any claimed pro-
competitive justifications or look at the restraint’s actual effect on 
competition.81 
In contrast, rule of reason analysis affords a court significant flexibility in 
balancing the possible anticompetitive harms with any procompetitive benefits. 
Rule of reason requires a more searching analysis of the behavior engaged in. 
Courts will weigh the anticompetitive concerns with possible procompetitive 
benefits.82 Specifically, the court must determine whether the questioned 
behavior “imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.”83 Courts will 
often consider a variety of factors, including information about the relevant 
business and industry, the condition of the industry before and after the alleged 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.84 Only 
after the plaintiff can show that the conduct produced an anticompetitive effect 
within the market does the burden shift to the defendant to show that the 
challenged conduct has a procompetitive purpose.85 
The D.C. Circuit, as well as the Sixth Circuit, considered similar facts in 
determining that reverse payment agreements were subject to antitrust scrutiny 
and, as a result, were anticompetitive. In In re Cardizem, the Sixth Circuit 
considered an agreement between HMR, the entity that manufactured and 
marketed the brand name prescription drug Cardizem CD, and a generic 
competitor, Andrx.86 The agreement was spurred by Andrx’s filing of an 
ANDA seeking approval to manufacture and sell a generic form of Cardizem 
 
 77. Id. at 19–20. 
 78. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
 79. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 20. 
 80. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344. 
 81. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 
(1984). 
 82. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 20. 
 83. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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CD.87 The agreement provided that Andrx would not market a generic version 
of Cardizem CD in the United States and, in return, HMR would pay Andrx 
forty million dollars per year beginning on the date Andrx received final 
approval from the FDA to market its generic drug.88 Additionally, the 
agreement stipulated that HMR would pay Andrx $100 million per year once it 
was determined that the patent was not infringed.89 The court determined that 
the agreement constituted horizontal market allocation.90 Specifically, the court 
found that the agreement intended to eliminate competition in the market for 
Cardizem throughout the entire United States,91 as the agreement guaranteed 
HMR’s exclusive access to the market for Cardizem CD throughout the United 
States until one of the end dates it stipulated in its agreement.92 Furthermore, 
the court determined that the agreement had the effect of delaying any other 
generic competitors from entering the market.93 Andrx had filed the first 
ANDA, and it was therefore guaranteed a 180-day exclusivity period that 
would not begin to run until it began to market its generic version of Cardizem 
CD.94 The agreement effectively delayed the running of the 180-day 
exclusivity period for Andrx because it had agreed not to relinquish it or 
transfer it.95 The court ultimately concluded that this was, on its face, 
horizontal market allocation. As such, it was deemed subject to per se antitrust 
analysis and found to be anticompetitive regardless of any pro-competitive 
effect it may ultimately provide. The court, however, failed to address whether 
per se analysis would apply to a settlement that did not require the 
relinquishing of the 180-day exclusivity period or a prohibition on marketing 
drugs that were not at issue in the underlying patent litigation.96 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail 
Corp. International that an agreement between a brand name drug 
manufacturer and a generic competitor was of the type that “antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent” and indicated that the conduct was unlawful and 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.97 The court in Andrx Pharmaceuticals was 
concerned with the agreement’s effect on potential generic competitors.98 The 
court found that the delay in competition would harm consumers by slowing 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 903. 
 90. Id. at 908. 
 91. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908. 
 92. Id. at 907. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Merck Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 16. 
 97. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 98. Id. at 813. 
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the introduction of lower-priced products into the market.99 However, like the 
Sixth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit failed to address the validity of the agreement as 
a whole, focusing instead on the 180-day exclusivity provision.100 
C. The Third Circuit Decision 
In its decision In re K-Dur, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the “scope 
of the patent” test and held that reverse payments are subject to “quick look 
rule of reason” analysis.101 In taking this position, the Third Circuit was the 
first federal appellate court to clearly indicate the presence of a circuit split on 
this issue.102 In In re K-Dur, Upsher, a generic manufacturer, filed an ANDA 
to manufacture a generic version of K-Dur.103 To prevent Upsher from 
engaging in the manufacture and marketing of the generic drug, Schering, the 
brand name manufacturer, agreed to pay Upsher sixty million dollars over 
three years.104 The court regarded this agreement as suspect and prima facie 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.105 Thus, applying the court’s 
reasoning, a “reverse payment” agreement is considered presumptively 
anticompetitive. The court noted that, under a “quick look rule of reason” 
analysis, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant may 
rebut the presumption of illegality by showing that either the payment was for 
a purpose other than delayed entry or offered some pro-competitive benefit.106 
While the FTC indicated that the Third Circuit’s position “reflects the 
appropriate balance between the competing interests implicated by such 
agreements,”107 others have remarked that this analysis would have a “chilling 
effect” on patent settlements between brand name and generic drug 
manufacturers.108 Thus, the Third Circuit’s In re K-Dur decision clearly 
created a circuit split, and ripened the issue for Supreme Court review. 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). 
 102. Merck Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4. 
 103. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205. 
 104. Id. at 205–06. 
 105. Id. at 218. 
 106. Id. 
 107. FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 21. 
 108. Merck Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 21. 
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III.  CONGRESS’S CONTINUED FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE 
A. Past Congressional Efforts 
As the circuit split described above developed, members of Congress 
attempted to formulate a solution to reverse payment settlements that they 
deemed to be anticompetitive. Congress first attempted to pass legislation to 
deal with this issue during the 109th Congress in 2006, in the form of Senate 
Bill 3582, also known as the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act 
(Preserve Access Bill).109 The Preserve Access Bill prohibited brand name 
drug companies from delaying the entry of generic drugs by providing the FTC 
with the ability to block a reverse payment settlement.110 Specifically, it 
provided that agreements settling patent infringement claims between a brand 
name and generic drug manufacturer were per se illegal.111 After being referred 
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, no further action 
was taken.112 The Preserve Access Bill was again introduced in 2007, although 
no significant action was taken, and again in 2009.113 
In 2009, the Preserve Access Bill was amended and, as a result, gained 
additional traction. The most significant amendment to the 2009 Preserve 
Access Bill was that agreements between brand name and generic drug 
manufacturers settling patent infringement claims were only presumed to be 
illegal, rather than deemed illegal per se.114 Specifically, the 2009 Bill was 
amended to read that a reverse payment agreement, while presumptively 
illegal, may be deemed legal if the parties to the reverse payment agreement 
demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive 
benefits . . . outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”115 
In adopting this position, Congress was pushing for a resolution to reverse 
payments that was contrary to the holdings of the Second, Eleventh, and 
Federal Circuits.116 As such, it was not necessarily a popular stance amongst 
all members of Congress.117 Critics of the 2009 Preserve Access Bill found that 
the bill’s presumption of illegality actually “amount[ed] to a de facto per se 
ban on covered settlements—and would entail all of the evils attendant to a per 
 
 109. S. COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, PRESERVE ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE GENERICS ACT, S. 
REP. NO. 111-123, at 6 (2d Sess. 2010). 
 110. Id. at 4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 6. 
 113. Id. at 6–7. 
 114. S. REP. NO. 111-123, at 7. 
 115. Id. at 8 (quoting §3(a)). 
 116. Alyssa L. Brown, Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem: Patent Misuse and 
Incremental Changes to the Hatch–Waxman Act as Solutions to the Problem of Reverse Payment 
Settlements, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 583, 597 (2012). 
 117. S. REP. NO. 111-123, at 18. 
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se ban.”118 These critics determined that the “presumption of illegality” was in 
fact a per se ban for two reasons. First, for the legal presumption to work, they 
believed that the parties must be “afforded a forum in which they can quickly 
and fairly test whether they have overcome the presumption.”119 However, 
they claimed that no such forum was available under the 2009 Preserve Access 
Bill because the issue would not be analyzed until the FTC brought an action, 
which could be years after the settlement was entered into.120 Second, and most 
importantly, the 2009 Preserve Access Bill provided that parties to reverse 
settlements could only rebut a presumption of illegality by the presentation of 
“clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the 
agreement outweigh [its] anticompetitive effects.”121 The critics explained that 
this is a “heavy burden,” inappropriate for commercial litigation, which “tilts 
the scales in a lawsuit sharply in the government’s favor.”122 Generally, critics 
espoused that implementing what effectively was a per se presumption against 
all agreement where the ANDA filer receives “anything of value” 
overcompensates for the problem and hinders agreements that may have 
procompetitive effects.123 Notably, these critics indicated they would support 
the creation of a legal presumption against drug patent settlements, but only if 
these issues were resolved and the presumption did not wholly favor the 
government.124 
B. Recent Congressional Efforts—Different Year, Same Results 
Recently, in 2013, a new version of the Preserve Access Bill was again 
introduced into the Senate.125 Glaringly, what is deemed a new version of the 
Preserve Access Bill is, for all intents and purposes, almost the exact same, 
line by line, as the 2011 version that was already considered by Congress and 
failed.126 Commentators have noted that because the 2013 bill is effectively the 
same as the 2011 version, “it does not address any of the ‘substantive 
concerns’ voiced by some Republicans and Democrats.”127 These 
commentators suppose that because the substance of the 2013 Preserve Access 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. S. REP. NO. 111-123, at 8. 
 122. Id. at 18. 
 123. Brown, supra note 116, at 603. 
 124. S. REP. NO. 111-123, at 18. 
 125. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 126. Compare S. 27, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), with S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(showing nearly identical bills). 
 127. Kurt R. Karst, Insanity? A Nearly Unchanged Preserve Access to Affordable Generics 
Act is Introduced in Congress, MARTINDALE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.martindale.com/litiga 
tion-law/article_Hyman-Phelps-McNamara-PC_1675802.htm. 
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Bill has not been changed to address criticisms of the 2011 bill’s legal 
presumption, it is unlikely that these criticisms will have changed.128 Indeed, 
although commentators declined to speculate on exactly how the 2013 
Congress would address the Preserve Access Bill, they asserted that much 
would be riding on the Supreme Court decision in this matter.129 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION V. ACTAVIS, INC. 
After a decade of observing Congress, federal agencies, and the circuit 
courts struggle to analyze reverse payments and fail to provide pharmaceutical 
companies with a coherent, sound framework for determining what agreements 
may or may not be considered illegal, the Supreme Court, in 2013, granted 
certiorari on the issue. Although there had been speculation that legislation was 
the most appropriate manner in which to resolve reverse payment disputes, it 
appeared that any such legislation was unlikely to pass in the near future.130 
Additionally, the circuit courts had not been able to provide much clarity for 
pharmaceutical companies in the way of understanding how a reverse payment 
may be analyzed.131 In fact, before the Supreme Court ruled on this issue, it 
appeared that an agreement may or may not be condemned depending on the 
circuit the case was brought in.132 As the FTC explained, the divergence 
among the circuit courts was “outcome-determinative,” in that antitrust 
defendants in the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits typically prevailed as 
a matter of law, while antitrust defendants in the Third, Sixth, and D.C. 
Circuits were ordered to further proceedings.133 Thus, pharmaceutical 
companies were in a precarious position as they moved forward and structured 
agreements that could appear as though the brand name manufacturer were 
paying generic manufacturers to refrain from entering the market. At the 
urging of the FTC and various stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry, the 
Supreme Court finally took up this issue and set forth a ruling in Federal 
Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., on June 17, 2013, to provide courts across 
the country with a uniform analysis of “reverse payment” agreements.134 
In its decision, the Court reviewed the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s complaint alleging that Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. See also Shannon U. Han, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache 
Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 944–46 (2013) (discussing the need for 
a legislative solution and Congress’s recent inability to pass such legislation). 
 131. See FTC Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10. 
 132. Id. at 10–11. 
 133. Id. at 13–14. 
 134. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), rev’g sub nom. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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unlawfully restricted trade by paying its generic competitors to delay bringing 
their product to market.135 The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
determination that patent holders have a lawful right to exclude others from the 
market.136 The Court noted that paragraph IV litigation, used by generic 
competitors to challenge a patent’s validity, necessarily “put[s] the patent’s 
validity at issue.”137 As such, the Court found that it is “incongruous to 
determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive 
effects solely against patent law policy.”138 Rather, the Court remarked that a 
reverse payment must be measured against both patent law policy and antitrust 
policy.139 
In this vein, the Court held that “reverse payment” agreements must be 
analyzed using “rule of reason” analysis.140 The Court asserted that “rule of 
reason” analysis is appropriate in this context because it appropriately weighs 
the considerations of both patent law and antitrust law.141 Importantly, the 
Court declined to apply “quick look” antitrust analysis, which the FTC had 
argued was applicable.142 The Court stated that “quick look” analysis is only 
appropriate where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”143 The Court supported its 
assertion by acknowledging that the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing 
about an anticompetitive effect depends upon its size, scale in relation to 
anticipated future litigation costs, and independence from other services.144 In 
other words, the Court determined that there were circumstances in which a 
reverse payment settlement would not be considered anticompetitive. As such, 
the Court ultimately concluded that a more comprehensive look at the 
agreement’s possible anticompetitive effects is required.145 Glaringly, the 
Court failed to articulate how a lower court might structure antitrust litigation; 
it merely stated that courts should avoid applying antitrust theories that are too 
abbreviated and those that are too searching.146 
 
 135. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 136. Id. at 2230. 
 137. Id. at 2231. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37. 
 141. Id. at 2237. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 146. Id. at 2238. 
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V.  THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN CONTEXT: HOW THE COURT’S PREVIOUS 
DECISIONS FORETOLD ITS DECISION IN FTC V. ACTAVIS 
Not surprisingly, the Court’s ruling was an obvious attempt to placate 
competing views, and achieve a balance between antitrust concerns and patent 
protection concerns. The Supreme Court’s previous rulings considering similar 
disputes foreshadowed its decision. In its recent rulings on patent disputes with 
antitrust implications, the Supreme Court tended to focus on the need to strike 
a proper balance between protecting a patent holder’s monopoly rights and 
protecting competition—an issue that is fundamental to the reverse payment 
disputes. The proper balance, however, has oftentimes been difficult to 
determine—even for Supreme Court Justices. Justice Breyer’s discussion 
during oral argument in Bilski v. Kappos147 sheds light on how the Court would 
regard the competing interests at issue in “reverse payment” agreements. 
Justice Breyer stated: 
There are actually four things in the patent law which everyone accepts. There 
are two that are plus and two that are minus. And the two that are plus is by 
giving people a monopoly, you get them to produce more [and] you get them 
to disclose. 
  The two minuses are they charge a higher price, so people use the product 
less; and moreover, the act of getting permissions and having to get permission 
can really slow things down and destroy advance[s]. So there’s a balance. 
  . . . And if you ask me as a person how to make that balance in respect to 
information, if I am honest, I have to tell you: I don’t know.148 
Justice Breyer’s discussion highlights the Supreme Court’s concern at the 
intersection of antitrust and patent law—how much protection should be 
provided to a patent holder? Although this has been a difficult question to 
answer, a review of recent Supreme Court decisions in this area foretold that 
the Court might ultimately favor the protection of competition over the 
protection of patent holders in the case of “reverse payments.” 
In recent years, the Supreme Court significantly increased the amount of 
patent law cases it addressed.149 The Court’s rulings, however, were generally 
not favorable to patent holders. Between 2006 and 2008, patent holders lost 
five consecutive patent cases reviewed by the Court.150 Additionally, the 
 
 147. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–20, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-
964). 
 149. Peter O. Huang, Recent Supreme Court Patent Decisions: The Trend to Limit the Power 
of Patent Holders, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 393, 393 (2009). 
 150. Id. at 395. See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 
U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
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opinions in these cases were not sharply divided; three of the five decisions 
were unanimous, with the others supporting only a lone dissenter.151 Although 
the issues and holdings varied in these cases and none are particularly salient to 
the issue here, it is important to note this trend of disfavoring patent holders 
and their exclusive patents. 
In a recent opinion that preceded Actavis, the Court had again reaffirmed 
traditional limits on patentability. In its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, decided in 
2010, the Court articulated a holding that reflected a conservative view of 
patent law, rejecting a patent application for a method of instructing how to 
hedge risk under its “precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas.”152 
Although the holding is fairly basic, the Court’s decision invoked two 
important concepts. First, it appeared that the Court was concerned about 
inflating the patent law beyond its original intent.153 The Court’s position 
articulated a deflation, rather than inflation, of patent rights. Thus, it lent itself 
to the conclusion that the Supreme Court was concerned about providing 
patent holders too much monopoly power.154 Second, the Court’s holding 
favored the arguments of those who were calling for a more certain application 
of the patent tests.155 The principles illustrated by the Court’s holding indicated 
that it favored a clear and structured analysis of reverse payment agreements to 
provide more certainty to pharmaceutical companies attempting to protect their 
patents.156 Additionally, it indicated that the Court was not necessarily inclined 
to protect a brand name manufacturer’s patent monopoly from any and all 
competitors.157 It is unlikely that the principles articulated in Bilski will 
necessarily be furthered by the Supreme Court’s holding in Actavis. 
VI.  SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH 
In adopting a “rule of reason” approach to reverse payment agreements, 
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that such agreements are either 
presumptively legal or presumptively illegal. Rather, the Court held that such 
agreements may bring about anticompetitive effects, depending on their size, 
scale, and other factors.158 As such, the Court proffered a view that has been 
criticized by many as being costly, time consuming, litigious, and arduous. 
The Court squarely addressed its “rule of reason” critics, specifically 
stating that the FTC need not “litigate the patent’s validity, empirically 
 
 151. Huang, supra note 149, at 398. 
 152. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 3231; Huang, supra note 149, at 394. 
 155. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Huang, supra note 149, at 397. 
 156. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229; Huang, supra note 149, at 393. 
 157. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228; Huang, supra note 149, at 393. 
 158. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
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demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system, present every possible 
supporting fact or refute every possible pro-defense theory.”159 Thus, the 
Supreme Court apparently lessened the burden placed on the FTC. However, it 
provided little direction on what the FTC, or any reverse payment challenger, 
would need to prove in order to make its case under “rule of reason” analysis. 
Additionally, it failed to provide a benchmark for what agreements may be 
reasonable and what agreements may be unreasonable. As such, the Court 
merely passed that buck to lower courts, stating that they could structure 
antitrust litigation to avoid making inquiries that were either too abbreviated to 
permit proper analysis or too unduly, considering every possible fact or theory 
irrespective of its relevance and applicability.160 This approach does not 
provide a clear understanding of how courts will view such arrangements and 
what litigation may be anticipated to challenge and defend them. Thus, it fails 
to address the issues plaguing the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, by 
stripping away the depth of inquiry required for “rule of reason” analysis, the 
Court’s approach appears confused and unclear—almost a reverse “quick 
look” approach in some respects. 
VII.  WHY THE “QUICK LOOK” IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TEST 
The “rule of reason” approach proffered by the Supreme Court does little 
to address the concerns of stakeholders in the industry and fails to provide 
clear guidance on what types of settlement agreements are acceptable. As such, 
the “quick look” approach articulated by the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur is 
superior to the “rule of reason” test, because it appropriately weighs the 
competing interests without placing an undue burden on either party to a 
dispute.161 Generally, courts apply “quick look” to market restraints that appear 
to be facially anticompetitive, but occur in markets or contexts that are new or 
not fit for traditional antitrust analysis.162 In the context of reverse payments, a 
quick look approach allows a plaintiff, most likely the Federal Trade 
Commission, to establish a prima facie case by showing that there was a 
reverse payment agreement made between a brand name drug manufacturer 
and a generic drug manufacturer that effectively delayed entrance of a generic 
drug onto the market.163 The reverse payment in these instances represents 
conduct that is facially anticompetitive because it ultimately reduces output 
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and keeps prices artificially high.164 Once a prima facie case is established, the 
“quick look” approach shifts the burden to the defendant drug manufacturer to 
show that either the agreement was for a purpose other than to delay entry or 
that it fosters a procompetitive benefit that outweighs the anticompetitive 
conduct.165 This shift provides the defendant drug manufacturer the 
opportunity to explain that the agreement was reached for a purpose other than 
to stifle competition or that it had procompetitive effects.166 As such, the 
burden-shifting scheme of the “quick look” analysis reflects the proper balance 
between competition and patent protection that the Supreme Court appeared to 
be favoring in their recent decisions, such as Bilski, but is currently lacking in 
the other, alternative tests. 
A. Inadequacy of Per Se, Scope of the Patent, and Rule of Reason Tests 
Analysis under the per se test is too favorable to generic challengers, 
providing no deference to the lawful patent held by a brand name 
pharmaceutical company.167 Although per se analysis provides for cost-
effective litigation, it is too one-sided in the case of “reverse payments.”168 
Additionally, it would likely stem innovation as pharmaceutical companies 
may be less inclined to spend enormous sums on research and development if 
they cannot sustain monopoly-level profits for a reasonable period of time.169 
The per se test does not take the need to foster innovation into consideration. 
As such, it gives no deference to the purpose of patent laws and patent 
protections. Finally, courts are wary of relying on per se rules of illegality if 
there is “no justification other than the enhancement of predictability and the 
reduction of judicial investigation” for it may be viewed as abdicating their 
responsibility to tackle difficult economic problems.170 In this instance, any per 
se rule would unduly burden the pharmaceutical industry and possibly reduce 
innovation and competition in the industry; thus, it is an inadequate response to 
reverse payment agreements. As such, the Supreme Court properly disregarded 
this approach for “reverse payment” agreements. 
Application of the scope of the patent test is similarly one-sided and unfair 
to generic manufacturers and consumers. The framework for the scope of the 
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patent test first articulated in In re Cardizem is no longer recognizable as it has 
subtly shifted throughout the years.171 In In re Cardizem, the Court condemned 
the reverse payment agreement as per se illegal in as far as it covered conduct 
lying outside of the valid patent.172 The logic of the Cardizem test, however, 
was warped by the Eleventh Circuit to mean that any agreement dealing with a 
product within a patent is per se valid by way of the scope of the patent.173 
Thus, the current scope of the patent test gives brand name pharmaceutical 
companies’ unbridled discretion to engage in anticompetitive behavior that 
may result in higher prices, so long as the agreement only deals with products 
mentioned in the brand name manufacturer’s patent.174 Courts that adopt the 
scope of the patent test prioritize patent law at the expense of unwisely 
diminishing antitrust law. The Supreme Court specifically rejected this 
approach in Actavis, finding that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant 
in determining the “scope of the patent monopoly.”175 
Finally, the rule of the reason test attempts to properly weigh 
anticompetitive concerns with concerns about bolstering innovation. However, 
this test is too arduous and demanding. Application of full-blown rule of 
reason analysis wastes not only the Court’s time and resources, but also the 
time and resources of the litigants.176 Additionally, the activity at issue is, on 
its face, anticompetitive.177 Thus, it seems unnecessary to do a searching 
market analysis to determine whether this practice stifles competition. 
B. “Quick Look” Strikes the Proper Balance 
“Quick look” analysis is not unique to the issue of reverse payment 
agreements. It has been used in recent years in the context of collegiate and 
professional sports, as well as professional associations, to abbreviate the rule 
of reason inquiry and simplify its corresponding market analysis.178 As such, it 
greatly diminishes the time that it takes to litigate a dispute.179 However, 
“quick look” is more searching than a per se rule of illegality and provides 
pharmaceutical companies the opportunity to justify their reverse payment 
agreements.180 In the cases where “quick look” developed, rule of reason 
analysis was unnecessary because the conduct at issue was plainly 
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anticompetitive.181 Yet, the conduct at issue in these cases was not so 
anticompetitive as to call for per se treatment.182 “Quick look” analysis 
provides the appropriate inquiry, for it allows courts “interpreting . . . antitrust 
laws [to] make reasonable decisions under limited information.”183 Similar to 
previous cases in which a version of “quick look” was used, reverse payment 
agreements involve obvious anticompetitive conduct, but may arguably offer 
some other purpose or procompetitive benefit. 
Much like previous instances in which courts have applied “quick look” 
analysis, reverse payment agreements represent a practice that is new, unusual, 
and unfamiliar to traditional antitrust analysis. Reverse payment agreements 
pose an unusual difficulty for courts because of the unique characteristics 
present in the pharmaceutical industry. As explained above,184 brand name 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers depend on patents in order to recoup 
research and development costs.185 The process of research and development 
results in innovation and ultimately more competition, as new drugs are 
developed and brought to market.186 Therefore, proponents of reverse payment 
agreements argue that they are necessary to protect patents and, without this 
patent protection, there would be little incentive to innovate in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The Supreme Court has dealt with a similar issue in 
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents.187 There, the 
Supreme Court considered a plan adopted by the NCAA that limited the 
televising of college football games.188 The Court found: 
  While the plan constitute[d] horizontal price fixing and output limitation, 
restraints that ordinarily would be held “illegal per se,” it would be 
inappropriate to apply a per se rule . . . where it involves an industry in which 
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.189 
In industries such as this, courts may find that the restraints at issue actually 
widen consumer choice, and thus, can be viewed as procompetitive.190 This 
analysis illustrates the Court’s understanding that although the Sherman Act 
prohibits restraints of trade, every contract is a restraint of trade, so the 
 
 181. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 
(1984). 
 182. Id. at 100. 
 183. Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 31. 
 184. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 185. Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1562–63. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 
(1984). 
 188. Id. at 91–94. 
 189. Id. at 86. 
 190. Id. at 102. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1212 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1189 
Sherman Act must have been intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints 
of trade.191 It is in this vein that the Supreme Court should consider reverse 
payment agreements. “Quick look” analysis affords the opportunity to both the 
FTC and the defendant drug manufacturer to explain why or why not the 
reverse payment agreement unreasonably restrained trade, but without 
inundating courts with excessive information. Additionally, “quick look” 
analysis articulates what critics to the Congressional Preserve Access Bill have 
been espousing for the past few years.192 It creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the reverse payment is illegal, but, unlike the 2013 Preserve Access Bill, it 
provides pharmaceutical companies with a more feasible way to rebut the 
presumption.193 The following provides an outline of how a court would 
evaluate “reverse payment” agreements under “quick look.” 
C. Analysis Under “Quick Look” 
1. Alleged Anticompetitive Effects 
The initial step in determining whether a reverse payment agreement is a 
reasonable restraint of trade pursuant to the Sherman Act is to determine if it 
adversely affects competition.194 The FTC has clearly articulated its view on 
this matter. The FTC finds that reverse payment agreements support monopoly 
pricing of brand-name drugs by delaying the onset of generic competition.195 
They claim that this adversely affects consumers because once a generic drug 
is brought to market, it is sold, on average, for about fifteen percent of the 
price charged for its comparable brand-name drug.196 Correspondingly, at this 
time, the brand-name manufacturer typically loses about ninety percent of its 
market share to generic competitors.197 The implication of the FTC’s findings 
for purposes of “quick look” analysis is that a reverse payment agreement 
between a brand-name drug manufacturer and a generic competitor likely 
inhibits competition by keeping prices artificially high and reducing 
competition. Under “quick look” analysis, this establishes a prima facie 
case.198 However, if a court does not find that this establishes a prima facie 
case, then its analysis may end without the defendant drug manufacturer 
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having to justify its conduct. Assuming, arguendo, the FTC can establish a 
prima facie case and satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the agreement 
adversely affects competition, a court would continue its “quick look” analysis 
and shift the burden to the defendant drug manufacturer. 
2. Procompetitive Benefits and Justifications for Reverse Payment 
Agreements 
When the FTC satisfies its initial burden, “quick look” analysis shifts the 
burden to the defendant drug manufacturer to present the procompetitive 
benefits and justifications for the reverse payment agreement.199 Unlike the 
2013 Preserve Access Bill, a court should not require “clear and convincing” 
evidence of procompetitive justifications, but rather, should consider whether it 
is more likely than not that the procompetitive benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects.200 This is a standard that is more attuned to 
commercial litigation and reflects a better balance between the government’s 
interests and pharmaceutical companies’ interests.201 Courts have discovered 
numerous procompetitive justifications for arrangements that might initially be 
determined to adversely affect competition.202 The most pertinent to reverse 
payment agreements is the creation of new products.203 Unlike cases of 
collegiate and professional sports, the new product at issue in reverse payment 
cases is not a byproduct of the restraint, but rather, a corollary of the restraint. 
For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court found that the NCAA 
“enables [collegiate football] to be marketed,” by virtue of the restraints it 
imposes.204 Thus, the Court thought its actions “widen[ed] consumer choice—
not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to 
athletes.”205 Here, the pharmaceutical company would have to make a 
compelling argument that its ability to protect its patent from generic infringers 
ultimately “widen[s] consumer choice” by funding additional research and 
development for new products. The stark difference between reverse payments 
and the restraints in NCAA is the proximity reverse payment agreements have 
to the “new” product they are creating. In NCAA, the agreement directly 
affected the product and its marketability.206 In the case of reverse payments, 
however, the reasoning is more attenuated. The Court would have to be 
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convinced that any monopoly-level profits would directly fund new products. 
Although this may be a challenging inference for a court to make, 
pharmaceutical companies should have the ability to justify their agreements 
and explain the procompetitive benefits those agreements may foster. 
CONCLUSION 
Reverse payment agreements between brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers have confounded Congress and the courts for over a decade. 
Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that these types of agreements should be 
subjected to “rule of reason” antitrust analysis. However, the Supreme Court 
failed to provide lower courts with any direction on how to structure this 
analysis. Additionally, the Court appeared to limit the inquiry required for 
“rule of reason” analysis, indicating that proof of anticompetitive effect would 
vary with the circumstances. Because “rule of reason” in this context does not 
address the concerns of the industry and provide a clear framework for 
structuring and analyzing agreements, this Comment argues that “quick look” 
is a better approach. “Quick look” analysis reviews the claims from both sides 
and weighs both the anticompetitive conduct with its supposed procompetitive 
benefits. It does not, however, “stubbornly insist on strict and exhaustive 
proof.”207 The Supreme Court should have adopted the “quick look” approach 
in order to provide pharmaceutical companies more certainty in forming their 
agreements and conducting their business and to protect consumers from 
anticompetitive conduct that will raise prices and diminish drug choices. 
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